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 Whatever Happened To Quick Look? 
Edward D. Cavanagh* 
In California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C.1 (hereafter “Cal Dental”), 
the Supreme Court observed that there is no sharp divide 
separating conduct that can be summarily condemned under 
section one of the Sherman Act2 as per se unlawful from conduct 
that warrants a more searching factual assessment to ascertain 
any anticompetitive effect and hence its legality.3 The Court 
further observed that not every antitrust claim falling outside the 
narrow ambit of per se illegality warrants the detailed Rule of 
Reason analysis prescribed in Chicago Board of Trade.4 The 
Court thereby eschewed any notion that section one analysis is 
dichotomous, i.e., that restraints of trade fall into one of two 
categories: per se violations, which are condemned out of hand; 
or Rule of Reason violations, which are condemned only after a 
detailed analysis of anticompetitive effects and procompetitive 
benefits.5 Rather, it suggested that conduct be adjudged on a 
sliding scale and that “the quality of proof required should vary 
with the circumstances.”6 
In so ruling, the Court specifically acknowledged what it had held 
implicitly in three earlier decisions7: that certain conduct, 
although falling outside of the narrow parameters of per se 
illegality, has such anticompetitive potential that absent proof of 
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law.  
1 526 U.S. 756 (1999).  
2 15 U.S.C. §1.  
3 Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 780–81.  
4 Id.  
5 Alan J. Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust 
Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 837 (2016). (describing the “all or 
nothing character” of the dichotomous approach).  
6 Id.  
7 See F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Board of 
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
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procompetitive justification it can be condemned after a “quick 
look” without a detailed market assessment.8 Accordingly, the 
Court acknowledged in principle the concept of a truncated Rule 
of Reason analysis. Ultimately, however, the Court concluded that 
“quick look” did not apply to the facts of the case and that a “less 
quick look” was necessary to assess defendant’s advertising 
restrictions because it was not intuitively obvious that these 
advertising restrictions by themselves would create 
anticompetitive effect and because the advertising restrictions 
may have actually promoted competition by eliminating 
unverifiable and misleading discount and quality of service 
advertising.9 
Quick look is tailor–made for restraints that bear a close family 
resemblance to price–fixing10 but are of the type with which courts 
have little experience or are idiosyncratic in nature.11 Proponents 
of quick look argue that quick look “improves upon the traditional 
dichotomous approach by reducing and enforcement and 
adjudication costs, enhancing the accuracy of administrative and 
judicial determinations and improving deterrence of harmful 
restraints.”12 Yet, notwithstanding Cal Dental’s ruling that quick 
look applies “[where] an observer with even rudimentary 
understanding of economics could conclude that the 
arrangements in question have anticompetitive effect on 
customers and markets,”13 quick look has not caught on in the 
lower courts. Indeed, with the notable exception of the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in Polygram Holding, Inc. v. F.T.C.14 (hereafter 
“Three Tenors”), the lower courts appear to have largely 
abandoned the quick look approach.15 
This article analyzes the evolution of the Rule of Reason, the 
emergence of quick look analysis, and its precipitous decline. It 
                                                                                                             
8 Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 770.  
9 Id. at 781.  
10 See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. F.T.C., 416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
11 See XI, Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law para. 1911 at 335–36 
(3d ed. 2011) (hereafter “Areeda & Hovenkamp”).  
12 See, Meese, supra note 5, at 881–82 (questioning the benefits of quick look analysis).  
13 Cal. Dental, 526 at 720. 
14 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir.2005).  
15 See Edward D. Cavanagh, The Rule of Reason Re–examined, 67 BUS. LAWYER 435, 
459 (2012).  
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argues that the traditional unstructured Rule of Reason analysis 
articulated in Chicago Board of Trade is unworkable in that it is 
costly, unpredictable, and has significant risks of error. This 
article further argues that the structured, nuanced, fact–specific 
inquiry utilized in Three Tenors would provide “more clarity, 
greater predictability, fewer errors and less expense in antitrust 
litigation”16 and that the lower courts should embrace—not 
shun—quick look. It concludes that widespread adoption of the 
quick look approach by lower courts is unlikely. In Cal Dental, 
the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify how the Rule 
of Reason should be applied in antitrust cases. Moreover, its 
decisions since Cal Dental have sent mixed signals on quick 
look.17 As a result, the concept of quick look, outside a narrow 
range of FTC cases, has largely become a dormant doctrine.18 
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16 Id. at 437.  
17 See infra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.  
18 See, Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of 
the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 461, 464 (2000) (“the quick look is an artifact of a 
bygone Populist era in which courts and enforcement agencies protected the freedom of 
traders from contractual restraints deemed ‘monopolistic’ by the applied price theory 
school of industrial organization”).  
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF REASON 
A. Chicago Board of Trade 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade.”19 Read literally, 
section one would bar any contract in interstate commerce because, as the 
Supreme Court has recognized, “[e]very agreement concerning trade, 
every regulation of trade, restrains”; and in fact, the “very essence” of 
every contract is “to restrain.”20 Congress made no effort to define the 
scope of the broad section one prohibition, nor what constitutes restraints 
of trade. Instead, Congress left it to the courts “to give shape to the statute’s 
broad mandate.”21 
In Standard Oil Co v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected the 
notion that the term “every” in section one must be read literally.22 Rather, 
the Court ruled that Congress had drawn the statute in light of the existing 
common law of trade restraints, which prohibited only unreasonable 
restraints of trade.23 Accordingly, section one bars only unreasonable 
restraints of trade; and thus, the Rule of Reason was born. 
Standard Oil, however, made no attempt to provide guidance on how 
the Rule of Reason would be applied to the facts of a particular case. Over 
a decade earlier, then–Judge Taft, writing for the Sixth Circuit in Addyston 
Pipe,24 ruled that the analysis must focus on the character of the restraint 
in question, not the degree.25 Addyston Pipe involved an action by the 
United States to prosecute a scheme to fix the price of pipe and to allocate 
sales territories among defendants.26 The defendants, focusing on the 
degree of restraint, argued that the restraints in question were not 
unreasonable and therefore lawful because they were not oppressive; that 
is, prices were not “too high.”27 Taft rejected that approach. He noted that 
at common law courts distinguished between naked restraints of trade and 
ancillary restraints of trade.28 Naked restraints—those agreements that had 
no purpose other than to restrain trade for the benefit of the conspirators—
were condemned out of hand by the common law courts.29 Ancillary 
                                                                                                             
19 15 U.S.C. § 1.  
20 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).  
21 Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).  
22 221 U.S. 1, 59–60 (1911).  
23 Id.  
24 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).  
25 Id. at 283–84.  
26 Id. at 278.  
27 Id. at 279.  
28 Id. at 284.  
29 Addyston Pipe, 85 F.271 at 283–84.  
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restraints—those restraints necessary to carry out the main purpose of the 
contract—were lawful if reasonable. Price fixing among competitors was 
a naked restraint and hence illegal per se; no question of reasonableness 
could be entertained by courts.30 
In so ruling, Judge Taft criticized those courts that have equated 
reasonableness with the degree of the restraint as having “set sail on a sea 
of doubt” and “assumed the power to say, in respect to contracts that have 
no other purpose and no other consideration on either side than the mutual 
restraint of the parties, how much restraint of competition is in the public 
interest, and how much is not.”31 Taft further stated that “[t]he manifest 
danger in the administration of justice according to so shifting, vague and 
indeterminate a standard would seem to be a strong reason against 
adopting it.”32 
The Supreme Court first confronted the question of how to apply the 
Rule of Reason in Chicago Board of Trade.33 There, the government 
challenged as price fixing a rule adopted by the Board of Trade which 
imposed a trading restriction on certain commodities by requiring buyers 
to freeze their bids from the close of one trading session to the beginning 
of the next, a period of some twenty hours.34 The Board of Trade argued 
that the restraint was reasonable and offered evidence of purported 
procompetitive benefits of its rule.35 The trial court struck from the record 
of evidence purporting to justify the restraint and then condemned the rule 
as unlawful on its face.36 
On appeal, the Supreme Court, with Justice Brandeis writing for the 
majority, reversed.37 Rejecting the per se approach, Justice Brandeis wrote 
that alleged restraints under section one had to be viewed in their factual 
context to determine whether they are reasonable:  
But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be 
determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains 
competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every 
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of 
their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the 
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps 
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may 
                                                                                                             
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 284.  
32 Id.  
33 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).  
34 Id. at 237–38.  
35 Id. at 237.  
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 241.  
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suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that 
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts 
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied, 
its condition before and after the restraint was imposed. 
The history if the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the 
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or 
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not 
because a good intention will save an otherwise 
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because 
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts 
and to predict consequences.38 
In applying these principles, Brandeis said that courts should focus on 
three issues; (1) the nature of the rule; (2) the scope of the rule; and (3) the 
effects of the rule.39 Brandeis ruled that a restriction on price making for 
part of a trading day was not anticompetitive in nature because the Call 
Rule did not prohibit trading after hours.40 The Rule only required buyers 
to decide prior to the close of a trading day the price that they would be 
willing to pay when trading reopened the next day.41 As to the scope of the 
Rule, Brandeis emphasized that the Rule was limited to “to arrive” grain 
and “applied only to a small part of the grain shipped from day to day to 
Chicago” and then for only part of the day. Exchange members could buy 
“to arrive” grain at any price during a trading session and could also buy 
grain in other markets without any restrictions.42 
Brandeis also concluded that the Call Rule had no appreciable effect 
on the market prices for grain because it applied to only a small portion of 
the grain shipped to Chicago daily and then for only part of the business 
day and did not apply at all to grain transported to markets outside 
Chicago.43 In addition to finding no appreciable anticompetitive effect, 
Brandeis cited a number of procompetitive benefits in the form of 
improved market conditions for to arrive grain.44 After concluding that the 
procompetitive benefits outweighed any anticompetitive effects, the Court 
reversed the decision below and directed judgment for the defendant.45 
The decision in Chicago Board of Trade is intriguing from both a 
substantive and procedural perspective. From a substantive perspective, 
                                                                                                             
38 Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.  
39 Id. at 239–40.  
40 Id. at 239.  
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 240.  
44 Id. at 240–241.  
45 Id. at 241. 
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the Court clearly rejected the concepts naked restraints of trade and per se 
illegality suggested by Judge Taft in Addyston Pipe.46 The Court—again 
contrary to Addyston Pipe—focused its analysis on the degree of the 
restraint, thus setting sail on the forbidden “sea of doubt.”47 
Procedurally, the decision is also baffling. Even though the trial court 
had stricken from the record all evidence of the Call Rule’s supposed 
procompetitive benefits, Brandeis’s opinion nonetheless cites a litany of 
procompetitive benefits.48 Where did Brandeis get all of these “facts”? 
They certainly did not come from the trial record. Worse, based on these 
facts from outside the record, Brandeis not only reversed the judgment 
below but also ordered that judgment be entered for the defendant.49 
Having found that the trial had improperly excluded evidence of potential 
procompetitive benefits, the Court should have remanded the case, 
directed the trial court to admit evidence of procompetitive benefits, and 
then have the trial court determine whether, on balance, procompetitive 
benefits outweighed any anticompetitive effects. 
Nevertheless, remand would not have cured the errors in the Court’s 
analysis; the analytical framework proposed by Brandeis is itself 
defective. The Court identifies a laundry list of factors that courts must 
consider in evaluating the reasonableness of an alleged restraint.50 Yet, it 
provides no indication of the importance of any one factor or what weight 
to assign each factor.51 Nor does it discuss the kinds of procompetitive 
benefits that are appropriately considered and weighed to offset 
anticompetitive effects.52 In short, Chicago Board of Trade provides little 
meaningful guidance to courts in assessing alleged restraints of trade. In a 
stinging rebuke, Judge, then–Professor, Easterbrook characterizes the 
Brandeis formulation as “empty.”53 
If the economist has a way to approach new practices, a 
judge today has none. According to the Supreme Court, 
“[T]he inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether 
the challenged agreements is one that promotes 
competition or one that suppresses competition . . . . 
[T]he purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about 
                                                                                                             
46 Addyston Pipe, 85 F.271 at 283–84.  
47 Id. at 284.  
48 Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 240–41.  
49 Id. at 241.  
50 Id. at 238.  
51 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 11, para.1502 at 389.  
52 See Robert P. Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 54 
ANTITRUST L.J. 893, 913–14 (1985) (“The balancing process inherent in any [R]ule of 
[R]eason analysis . . . at least as currently applied . . . produces a hopeless morass”).  
53 Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1984).  
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the competitive significance of the restraints . . . .” How 
does a court tell whether the arrangement promotes or 
suppresses competition? It must consider the fact peculiar 
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its 
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the 
nature of the restraint and its effect, or actual or probable. 
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the 
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or 
end sought to be achieved are all relevant facts. These 
formulations are empty. Judges and justices rightly 
protest that courts cannot make these judgments. “Courts 
are of limited utility in examining difficult economic 
problems . . . . [They are] ill–equipped and ill–suited for 
such decision making [and cannot] analyze, interpret, and 
evaluate the myriad of competing interests and the endless 
data that would surely be brought to bear on such 
decisions.”54 
Moreover, the weighing process itself is fraught with peril. First, 
Judge Easterbrook argues that “[i]t is pointless to weigh inter against intra–
brand competition because they are not commensurable.”55 Second, the 
process is likely riddled with mistakes. As Justice Breyer, dissenting in 
Leegin, observed: “One cannot fairly expect judges and juries (in resale 
price maintenance cases) to apply complex economic criteria without 
making a considerable number of mistakes.”56 Nowhere is this tendency 
more apparent than in the Chicago Board of Trade case itself. As 
discussed, Brandeis identified nine procompetitive benefits stemming 
from the Call Rule. The problem with that analysis is that none of the 
benefits cited bears any relation to the price–fixing feature of the Call 
Rule. Put another way, all of these benefits could have been achieved 
without the price restraint in question. 
Even if courts were up to the task of weighing, the Rule of Reason as 
articulated by Justice Brandeis is unwieldy.57 The breadth of the inquiry 
outlined in Chicago Board of Trade opens up the litigation to all manner 
                                                                                                             
54 Id. at 12.  
55 Id. at 13.  
56 See Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 917 (2007) 
(Breyer, J. dissenting).  
57 See Easterbrook, supra note 53, at 12. (Noting that the Rule of Reason requires courts 
to take into account numerous market facts and then weigh procompetitive benefits against 
anticompetitive effects, while giving courts little guidance on how various factors should 
be weighed).  
2017] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 47 
 
of evidence challenging or defending the restraints at issue.58 That, in turn, 
generates costly pretrial discovery, as well as satellite litigation over 
discovery disputes, heftier trial records and longer, more complicated 
trials.59 All of these add significantly to the cost of antitrust litigation. 
These added costs have a distributive effect favoring defendants, who have 
deeper pockets and hence more financial staying power than plaintiffs.60 
Moreover, the intensively fact–bound nature of the Rule of Reason 
inquiry, particularly its emphasis on anticompetitive effects rather than 
unlawful conduct, makes antitrust outcomes less predictable.61 Analysis 
under the Rule of Reason is largely an ex post exercise. Parties will not 
know if their conduct is illegal until after they engage in it.62 The Board 
of Trade analysis does not provide the parties with a traffic signal that 
would let them know that there will be consequences, even if no tangible 
harm ensues.63 Lack of certainty not only makes litigation riskier, but also 
makes business decisions more difficult. Lack of certainty in the business 
community can have the ironic and wholly unintended effect of chilling 
potentially procompetitive behavior by risk averse entities. 
In short, Justice Brandeis’ formulation of the Rule of Reason is riddled 
with holes. Its shortcomings have become more glaring as business 
transactions have grown more complex, economic principles have become 
better understood, and antitrust analysis has grown more sophisticated. 
Yet, despite its deficiencies, Chicago Board of Trade has never been 
explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court and is still cited by courts today 
for its description of the Rule of Reason.64 
B. Per se Rules 
Not surprisingly, given the burdensome nature of the Rule of Reason 
articulated in Chicago Board of Trade, courts began to look for shortcuts 
in its application.65 Early on, courts, building on Judge Taft’s ruling in 
                                                                                                             
58 Id. at 12. (Observing that judges are “ill–equipped and ill–suited” to “analyze, 
interpret and evaluate the myriad of competing interests and the endless data that would 
surely be brought to bear on such decision”). (citation omitted).  
59 See Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 450.  
60 Id.  
61 Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1375, 1428–29 (2009). 
62 Id. at 1426. (Because lack of anticompetitive intent is not a defense, a firm may be 
held liable even though it could not have predicted the anticompetitive effect of its 
conduct); see Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 450. 
63 Cavanagh, supra note15, at 445.  
64 See, e.g., American Needle, Inc., v, NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 203, n. 10 (2010).  
65 See Meese, supra note 5, at 881 (“The indisputable costs of full–blown rule of reason 
analysis understandably encourages courts, scholars, and enforcement officials to explore 
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Addyston Pipe, came to realize that certain restraints were so pernicious 
and so devoid of economic benefit that they can be adjudged and 
condemned without the elaborate analysis called for in Chicago Board of 
Trade.66 This insight, supported by both judicial experience and economic 
theory, led to per se condemnation of certain restraints, including 
horizontal price fixing67 and division of markets among competitors.68 
Under the per se analysis, the plaintiff is spared the burden of defining 
relevant markets and proving the defendant’s market power.69 Once the 
court finds that the conduct at issue is within the per se category, that 
conduct is “conclusively presumed to unreasonably restrain 
competition.”70 Whereas the Rule of Reason is a rule of construction,71 the 
per se rule is largely a rule of evidence72 that prohibits defendants from 
offering evidence of procompetitive benefits for conduct that the courts 
have determined is inherently anticompetitive.73 The per se approach 
offers several benefits that the Chicago Board of Trade approach lacks, 
including clarity, predictability, administrability, and efficiency.74 After 
the Socony–Vacuum decision in 1940, per se rules became firmly 
embedded in antitrust jurisprudence. Courts became enamored of the per 
se approach in part because of the benefits described above but also 
because of the widely held perception “that courts are of limited utility in 
examining difficult economic problems”75 and therefore should not 
“ramble through the wilds of economic theory.”76 
                                                                                                             
alternative methods for evaluating the numerous restraints that avoid per se 
condemnation.”).  
66 See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927); see also 
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Unites States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1950) (“there are certain 
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack 
of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal 
without elaborate injury as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for 
their use.”).  
67 Id.; see generally United States v. Socony–Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).  
68 See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 614 (1972).  
69 See Northern Pacific Railway, 356 U.S. at 5.  
70 Id.  
71 Spencer Weber Waller, Understanding and Appreciating Competition Law, 61 
ANTITRUST L.J. 55, 62 (1992).  
72 Edward D. Cavanagh, Vertical Price Restraints After Leegin, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. 
REV. 1, 29 (2008).  
73 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927).  
74 See Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 445.  
75 Topco, 405 U.S. at 609.  
76 Id. at 609–10, n. 10.  
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C. Emergence of Quick Look 
The Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Topco represents the high–
water mark of per se jurisprudence. Yet, even as courts looked to expand 
the reach of per se rules in the 1960’s and early 1970’s, academic criticism 
of per se analysis became widespread.77 Although there was virtual 
unanimity in the antitrust community that price fixing among competitors 
serves no legitimate economic purpose and should be condemned out of 
hand, there was substantial disagreement as to whether per se rules were 
appropriate beyond that narrow band of cases involving horizontal 
agreement to fix prices or to divide territories. Critics questioned the 
wisdom of applying per se rules to vertical restraints.78 The Supreme 
Court’s 1967 decision in Schwinn,79 condemning as per se unlawful the 
imposition of territorial restraints by a seller where the seller has parted 
with title, domain, and risk, became a particular target of scholarly 
venom.80 Schwinn, of course, was overruled a decade later by Sylvania,81 
which held that vertically imposed territorial restraints should not be 
condemned out of hand.82 Thirty years after Sylvania, the Supreme Court 
in Leegin83 abnegated the per se rule with respect to vertically imposed 
price restraints.84 
Moreover, criticism of per se analysis was not confined to its 
application to vertical restraints. As businesses grew more sophisticated 
and transactions more complicated, courts began to see that the per se rule 
could, in certain cases, be too blunt an instrument to use in analyzing 
transactions involving horizontal restraints that may appear at first blush 
to be anticompetitive but upon fuller analysis promoted, rather than 
restrained, competition. Accordingly, courts began to take a more 
circumspect and nuanced approach to horizontal restraints. BMI85 is a case 
in point. There, CBS challenged the blanket licenses offered by BMI and 
ASCAP under which users of copyrighted music would have access to the 
                                                                                                             
77 Id. at 609, n. 10.  
78 See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 280–85 (1993).  
79 United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381 (1967).  
80 See BORK, supra note 78, at 285 (“Antitrust is capable of sustaining meaningless 
distinctions and state paradoxes but those of Schwinn were too many and too obvious to 
persist for long. The precedent suffered a timely and deserved demise shortly after its tenth 
anniversary.”).  
81 Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).  
82 Id. at 49 (With respect to non–price vertical restraint, “the factfinder weighs all of the 
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as 
imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.”).  
83 Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).  
84 Id. at 890.  
85 Broadcast Music, Inc., v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).  
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entire BMI or ASCAP libraries for a single fee.86 The Second Circuit had 
ruled that the blanket license was “literally” price fixing and should be 
condemned out of hand.87 The Supreme Court rejected the per se analysis, 
ruling that the blanket license was procompetitive because it (1) created a 
new product; (2) increased rather than decreased output; (3) reduced 
transactions costs; (4) enhanced consumer choice; and (5) was preferred 
by consumers.88 In so ruling, the Court observed that “easy labels do not 
always supply ready answers.”89 The Court remanded the case for a full 
analysis under the Rule of Reason, but the Court clearly was of the view 
that the blanket license would pass muster under that standard.90 
Similarly, in National Society of Professional Engineers (“NSPE”)91 
the Court was again hesitant to invoke per se condemnation of a horizontal 
arrangement. At issue was an NSPE ethics rule that prohibited members 
from discussing pricing on building projects “until after negotiations [had] 
resulted in the initial selection of an engineer.”92 The government sued 
alleging that the restrictions on competitive bidding suppressed price 
competition among rivals.93 The NSPE defended, arguing that restraints 
imposed by professional codes of ethics should not be summarily 
condemned and that the restraints enhanced consumer welfare by 
promoting safe structures.94 
The Court rejected those arguments and ruled: 
While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate 
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the 
anticompetitive character of such an agreement. It 
operates as an absolute ban in competitive bidding, 
applying with equal force to both complicated and simple 
projects and to both inexperienced and sophisticated 
customers. As the District Court found, the ban “impedes 
the ordinary give and take of the market place,” and 
substantially deprives the customers of “the ability to 
utilize and compare prices in selecting engineering 
                                                                                                             
86 Id. at 4.  
87 Id. at 8. 
88 Id. at 19–24.  
89 Id. at 8.  
90 Id. at 24–25.  
91 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).  
92 Id. at 682–83.  
93 Id. at 684.  
94 Id. at 681, 684–88.  
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services . . . .” On its face, this agreement restrains trade 
within the meaning of §1 of the Sherman Act.95 
In so holding, the Court considered—and rejected—NSPE defenses 
and procompetitive justifications.96 NSPE marks a subtle shifting toward 
more textured approach to per se illegality. Here, we have a case which, 
while not classic price–fixing, is clearly anticompetitive in character. The 
Court had no problem condemning the arrangement, but only after taking 
into account possible justifications.97 
BMI and NSPE laid the foundation for three subsequent Supreme 
Court cases under section one of the Sherman Act: NCAA,98 Indiana 
Federation of Dentists,99 and Cal Dental.100 In NCAA, plaintiffs, some 
member schools with football programs, sued the NCAA, alleging that by 
acting as the exclusive agent of member schools to negotiate with national 
networks the right to televise college football games and by banning 
member schools negotiating their own deals for televising their football 
games, the NCAA violated section one of the Sherman Act.101 The 
package negotiated by the NCAA provided for: (1) appearance 
requirements under which at least 82 different schools would have 
television exposure during the life of the contract; and (2) appearance 
limitations, which restricted the number of times a given school could 
appear over the three year term of the contract.102 Actual payments for 
television rights per game would be negotiated with the member schools, 
but the aggregate payment to all schools had to be at least $131.75 million 
under the contract.103 
The arrangement clearly restricted output and artificially inflated the 
price for rights to televise college football games.104 Both the Southern 
District of New York105 and Second Circuit106 condemned the NCAA 
television policy as per se illegal. The Supreme Court agreed that the 
NCAA conduct was unlawful but declined to apply the per se rule.107 In so 
ruling, the Court identified three factors that did not underlie its decision 
                                                                                                             
95 Id. at 692–93.  
96 Id. at 693–94.  
97 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs at 694.  
98 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).  
99 F.T.C. v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).  
100 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 752 (1999).  
101 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F. 2d 1147, 1149–50 (2d Cir. 1983).  
102 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 94.  
103 Id. at 92–93.  
104 Id. at 107–108.  
105 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1300–01. (S.D.N.Y. 
1982).  
106 NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1153–54.  
107 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100.  
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to eschew per se analysis: (1) lack of experience with this type of restraint; 
(2) the fact that the NCAA was a not–for–profit entity; and (3) respect for 
the NCAA’s historic function of fostering amateurism in athletes.108 
Rather, analogizing the NCAA to a professional sports league, the 
Court held that some horizontal restraints among members were necessary 
if the product—college athletics—were to exist at all; and therefore, per 
se analysis was inappropriate in this case.109 That said, the Court wasted 
little time in condemning the NCAA television plan. It concluded that the 
NCAA plan “has a significant potential for anticompetitive effects”110 and 
that the “anticompetitive consequences of this arrangement are 
apparent.”111 The Court rejected out of hand the NCAA’s defense that it 
lacked market power, ruling that “the absence of market power does not 
justify a naked restraint on price or output.”112 The Court then cut to the 
chase: “This naked restraint on price and output requires some competitive 
justification even in the absence of a detailed market analysis.”113 The 
Court went on to reject all of the NCAA’s proffered justifications and 
affirmed the finding of liability.114 
The Court took a similar approach in Indiana Federation of 
Dentists.115 In that case, a group of dentists agreed not to comply with an 
insurance company protocol that required dentists to submit dental 
records, x–rays and treatment plans as a prerequisite to insurance company 
approval of coverage for their patients.116 The FTC ruled this conduct 
constituted an unlawful group boycott.117 The Seventh Circuit reversed, 
holding that absent proof of a relevant market and market power, no 
violation had been established.118 
Reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court utilized that same 
analytical framework that it had used in NSPE and NCAA.119 First, the 
court found that defendants’ conduct did not fit the mold of a classic group 
boycott that courts have traditionally condemned out of hand.120 
Nevertheless, the Court found that by refusing to furnish the requested data 
to insurance companies, defendants denied information to patients and 
                                                                                                             
108 Id. at 100–01.  
109 Id. at 101–02.  
110 Id. at 104.  
111 Id. at 106.  
112 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109.  
113 Id. at 110.  
114 Id. at 111–20.  
115 See F.T.C. v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).  
116 Id. at 451.  
117 Id. at 451–52.  
118 Id. at 453.  
119 Id. at 458–59.  
120 Id. at 458.  
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“limited consumer choice by impairing the ordinary give and take of the 
marketplace.”121 The Court further found that the FTC’s proof of 
detrimental effects on competition obviated any need for a market 
inquiry.122 Having found an adverse impact on competition, the court then 
entertained and summarily rejected defendants’ proffered procompetitive 
justifications.123 
Thereafter, in Cal Dental, the court gave its blessing to the quick look 
approach.124 The California Dental Association (“CDA”) was a non–profit 
organization with some 19,000 member dentists.125 The CDA had a code 
of ethics that prohibited false advertising with respect to price and quality 
of service.126 The FTC contended that these restrictions in themselves were 
not problematic but that as implemented, CDA barred any advertising of 
discounts (even if truthful) and similarly any advertising with respect to 
quality of services.127 The FTC concluded that the restrictions on price 
advertising were per se unlawful and that, alternatively, restrictions on 
both price advertising on non–price advertising would be unlawful under 
a quick look analysis.128 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed but rejected the application of the per se 
rule and held the conduct in question unlawful under a quick look 
analysis.129 The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Circuit Court.130 In 
so ruling, the Court did give its seal of approval to the quick look analysis. 
The Court for the first time acknowledged that the rulings in NCAA, IFD, 
and NSPE “formed the basis for what has come to be called abbreviated 
or ‘quick look’ analysis under the rule of reason.”131 The Court held that 
the quick look approach applies where “an observer with even a 
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the 
arrangement in question would have an anticompetitive effect on 
customers and markets.”132 
Moreover, the Court stated explicitly what it had hinted at in NSPE, 
NCAA, and IFD: that there are no bright lines separating per se restraints 
                                                                                                             
121 Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459.  
122 Id. at 460.  
123 Id. at 462–64.  
124 Cal. Dental. Ass’n v. F.T.C. 526 U.S. 756, 769–70 (1999).  
125 Id. at 757.  
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127 Id. at 762.  
128 Id. at 762–63.  
129 Id. at 763–64.  
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from those requiring a more detailed analysis, stating that “[t]he truth is 
that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are far less fixed 
than terms like ‘per se’, ‘quick look’ and ‘[R]ule of [R]eason’ tend to make 
them appear.”133 Accordingly, the Court proposed a sliding scale under 
which “the quality of proof required should vary with the 
circumstances.”134 Given that “there is generally no categorical line to be 
drawn between restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference 
of anticompetitive effect and those that call for a more detailed 
treatment,”135 the Court must engage “in an enquiry meet for the case, 
looking to the circumstances, details and logic of the restraint.”136 
Having accepted the “quick look” concept in principle, the Court 
ultimately concluded that a “less quick look” was essential in analyzing 
CDA’s advertising restrictions and reversed the Ninth Circuit because (1) 
the alleged anticompetitive effect on advertising was not intuitively 
obvious and (2) the ban on misleading and unverifiable discount 
advertising may have promoted, rather than restrained, competition.137 
That said, the Court also emphasized that the fact that quick look is found 
to be inapplicable does not necessarily mean that a full–blown Rule of 
Reason analysis is required.138 
Although Cal Dental provides some useful insights into the operation 
of the Rule of Reason, particularly that the Rule of Reason operates on a 
continuum without a sharp divide between per se and Rule of Reason and 
that the quantum of proof should be proportional to the nature of the 
conduct, the decision provides little guidance to the lower courts on how 
quick look should be implemented. Moreover, the guidance that the court 
does provide is not particularly useful. For example, as discussed above, 
the Court states that quick look analysis is appropriate when the 
anticompetitive nature of the conduct is obvious, even to a person with 
little understanding of economics.139 Yet, the Court is silent on the 
question of why the degree of economic analysis for a particular set of 
facts should turn on what those with limited understanding of economics 
perceive. For these reasons, Cal Dental must be viewed as a lost 
opportunity for clarifying the application of the Rule of Reason generally 
and quick look in particular. 
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139 Id. at 770.  
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D. Do We Need Quick Look? 
Support for the quick look protocol is widespread within the antitrust 
world.140 Proponents of quick look view it as an improvement over 
traditional Rule of Reason analysis for several reasons: (1) it reduces 
litigation costs; (2) it fosters deterrence by encouraging lawsuits that might 
otherwise be intimidated by the burdens of a traditional Rule of Reason 
case; and (3) it achieves cost savings without barring defendants from 
presenting justifications for their conduct.141 More importantly, the quick 
look approach gives antitrust plaintiffs a fighting chance in cases that fall 
outside the per se ambit. In effect, Rule of Reason equals Judgment for the 
Defendant.142 
Antitrust plaintiffs are at a severe disadvantage in traditional Rule of 
Reason cases for a variety of reasons. First, they are generally outgunned 
by deep pocket defendants who can afford to retain top law firms and 
economic consultants and who can always find economic benefits in the 
challenged conduct. Second, as discussed above,143 the Chicago Board of 
Trade is indeterminate and provides little guidance to the courts. Third, 
the courts have difficulty weighing procompetitive benefits against 
anticompetitive effects.144 Fourth, in the face of this uncertainty, it is 
difficult for courts to impose treble damages on defendants. In short, quick 
look can serve to level the antitrust playing field without arbitrary 
disadvantaging defendants. 
Quick look, however, is not without its detractors. One critic has 
described quick look as “all pain and no gain.”145 Critics also argue that a 
quick look analysis adds significant costs to antitrust proceedings without 
concomitant benefits.146 In particular, they argue that courts rarely invoke 
                                                                                                             
140 See Meese, supra note 5 at 838 (“Support for quick look is universal within the 
antitrust community; courts, enforcement agencies and numerous scholars have endorsed 
the approach.”). 
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 855 (“Plaintiffs almost never prevail in a full–blown rule of reason case. Most 
importantly, proof of a prima facie case, whether through proof of market power or actual 
detrimental effects, is difficult. Indeed, one recent study of all rule of reason cases decided 
between early 1999 and mid–2009 concluded that ninety–seven percent of such cases fail 
at this first stage because plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case of harm. This result 
was consistent with the result the same author obtained after studying several hundred rule 
of reason cases decided between 1977 and 1998. Also, in that small subset of cases in which 
plaintiffs do establish harm and thus a prima facie case, defendants nonetheless prove 
benefits that outweigh harms in most such cases. The more recent of these two studies 
found that plaintiffs prevailed in about one percent of full–blown rule of reason cases.” 
(footnotes omitted)).  
143 See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text.  
144 See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.  
145 See Meese, supra note 5, at 863.  
146 Id. at 882.  
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quick look so that cases are ultimately analyzed under a full Rule of 
Reason that would apply were there no quick look in the first place.147 
Further, where quick look is applied, the restraint would probably have 
been condemned under a per se assessment, which is less costly than quick 
look.148 
However, critics of quick look also acknowledge that under the Rule 
of Reason, antitrust defendants are nearly always successful in cases 
falling outside of the per se spectrum.149 This fact alone is a strong reason 
for the courts to develop a workable and robust quick look protocol that 
would help level the antitrust playing field. 
II. POST–CAL DENTAL RULINGS ON QUICK LOOK 
A. Supreme Court 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not taken steps to fill the 
analytical void left by Cal Dental in the nearly two decades since that 
decision was handed down. Not once has the Court invoked quick look 
post Cal Dental. In Dagher, the Court rejected quick look out of hand.150 
In Leegin,151 the Court, reversing a century of precedent, held that resale 
price maintenance should not be subject of per se condemnation152; rather, 
vertically imposed price restraints must be evaluated under a full–blown 
Rule of Reason.153 Thereafter, in Actavis,154 the Court declined to hold that 
reverse payments made to settle patent infringement cases should be 
viewed as presumptively unlawful, notwithstanding the anomaly that the 
victim of the alleged infringement ends up compensating the alleged 
infringer.155 The Court concluded that reverse payments failed to meet the 
criterion for quick look set forth in Cal Dental 
because the likelihood of a reverse payment bringing 
about anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its 
scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation 
costs, its independence from other services for which it 
might represent payment, and the lack of any other 
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convincing justification. The existence and degree of any 
anticompetitive consequence may also vary among 
industries. These complexities lead us to conclude that the 
FTC must prove its cases as in any other rule–of–reason 
cases.156 
Moreover, the Court post Cal Dental has sent mixed signals with 
respect to quick look. For example, in Leegin, the Court seems to embrace 
a dichotomous Rule of Reason/per se approach,157 stepping back from 
language in Cal Dental that the Rule of Reason must be viewed as a 
spectrum with “no categorical line to be drawn between restraints that give 
rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those 
that call for a more detailed treatment.”158 At the same time, the Court in 
Leegin also suggested that as trial courts gain experience with r/p/m cases, 
the detailed analysis prescribed in Chicago Board of Trade may not be 
necessary and that courts can “devise rules over time for offering proof, or 
even presumptions, where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and 
efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to promote 
procompetitive ones.”159 
Similarly, the Court in Actavis ruled that although reverse payment 
arrangements should not be viewed as presumptively unlawful, a full–
blown Rule of Reason analysis may not be necessary, and that courts may 
devise a structured Rule of Reason analysis.160 The court seems to say that 
there may be a quick look or a not so quick look but nothing more. 
Essentially, the Court has left the task of fleshing out the quick look 
doctrine to the lower courts.161 While there is surely some wisdom in 
allowing courts to develop experience with various types of restraints in 
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157 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886 (“The rule of reason does not govern all restraints. Some types 
“are deemed unlawful per se.” The per se rule, treating categories of restraints as 
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order to determine which restraints are likely to have negative impact on 
competition and which restraints require a detailed assessment before 
anticompetitive effect can be measured, that approach also creates 
uncertainty among litigants and adds significantly to the cost of litigation. 
For example, in the wake of Cal Dental, antitrust plaintiffs must still be 
prepared to present alternative theories of liability—per se, quick look and 
Rule of Reason.162 Relying exclusively on a per se theory or a quick look 
theory would be fatal were the court to conclude that a full blown Rule of 
Reason analysis would be required.163 Yet, the higher costs incurred by the 
preparation and the presentation of the alternative theories is precisely the 
opposite result intended through use of quick look analysis.164 The 
abbreviated Rule of Reason approach is intended as a shortcut to save time 
and money rather than as an additional burden on antitrust litigants. Put 
another way, the exigencies of developing a winning trial strategy may 
defeat the purpose of quick look. 
B. Lower Courts 
As discussed,165 the Supreme Court in Actavis and Leegin left it to the 
lower courts to shape the antitrust analysis in reverse payment and r/p/m 
cases. In Dagher, the Court found the doctrine to be inappropriate. 
However, in the nearly two decades since the decision in Cal Dental, lower 
courts have made little progress in developing the parameters of quick 
look. Indeed, the quick look doctrine appears to be in limbo. 
1. FTC 
One notable exception is the Three Tenors166 case in the D.C. Circuit. 
In that case, the FTC challenged certain agreements between Polygram 
and Warner as part of a joint venture to distribute an album recorded by 
the Three Tenors in connection with their appearance at the 1998 World 
                                                                                                             
162 See Stucke, supra note 61, at 1413 (“But the Court [in Cal Dental] never gave 
guidance as to where along the continuum the lower courts should evaluate specific kinds 
of restraints. Absent such guidance, antitrust plaintiffs face a difficult tactical decision: if 
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Cup of Soccer.167 Warner had exclusive worldwide rights to the album.168 
Warner chose to distribute the album only in the United States and licensed 
the international rights to Polygram.169 The Three Tenors had previously 
released albums in connection with the 1990 and 1994 World Cup 
championships, both of which had been financial successes.170 At some 
point after the joint venture had been established, the parties learned that 
the repertoire for the 1998 concert would substantially overlap those of the 
1990 and 1994 concerts.171 Thereafter, Polygram and Warner agreed, inter 
alia, to suspend advertising and discounting of the earlier albums.172 
The FTC challenged the agreed upon restraints under § 45 of the FTC 
Act,173 relying on its earlier decision in In re Massachusetts Board of 
Optometry,174 (“Mass. Board”). The FTC argued that the restraints in 
question were “inherently suspect”, i.e., likely to restrict competition and 
decrease output, and, absent proof of procompetitive justification, are 
presumptively unlawful.175 Applying the Mass. Board truncated analysis, 
the Commission concluded that the restraints in question were unlawful.176 
Affirming, the D.C. Circuit not only embraced the analytical 
framework in Mass. Board but also clarified its application, harmonizing 
the Mass. Board approach with that taken in Cal Dental.177 The Court of 
Appeals ruled that a restraint is presumptively unlawful “[i]f, based upon 
economic learning and the experience of the market, it is obvious that the 
restraint of trade likely impairs competition”.178 The Court further 
explained that “the rebuttable presumption of illegality arises not 
necessarily from anything ‘inherent’ in a business practice but from the 
close family resemblance between the suspect practice and another 
practice that already stands convicted in the court of consumer welfare.”179 
Thus, “as economic learning and market experiences evolve, so too will 
the class of restraints subject to summary adjudication.”180 The Court 
concluded: “an agreement between joint venturers to restrain price cutting 
and advertising with respect to products not part of the joint venture looks 
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suspiciously like a naked price fixing agreement between competitors, 
which would ordinarily be condemned as per se unlawful.”181 
The D.C. Circuit further noted that the “Supreme Court has recognized 
time and again that agreements restraining autonomy in pricing and 
advertising impede the ‘ordinary give and take of the market place.’”182 
Therefore, in the absence of any plausible explanations to the contrary, the 
challenged restraints could be summarily condemned. 
Thereafter, the FTC successfully invoked the “inherently suspect” 
framework in North Texas Specialty Physicians v. F.T.C..183 In that case, 
the North Texas Specialty Physicians (“NTSP”), an association of doctors, 
negotiated fee arrangements with payors on behalf of the participating 
doctors.184 Once the NTSP was in negotiation with a particular payor, 
member doctors were barred under Physicians Participation Agreements 
from separately negotiating their own deals with that payor.185 As a result, 
the NTSP effectively eliminated price competition from any member 
doctor willing to accept lower fees than those negotiated on behalf of the 
group.186 
The FTC argued that the collective action by the physicians 
constituted a form of price fixing.187 The Administrative Law Judge found 
that the conduct constituted horizontal price fixing and condemned it out 
of hand, and the FTC affirmed.188 Although acknowledging that the 
restraints might be “characterized as per se unlawful under the antitrust 
laws and then subject to summary condemnation,” the FTC, relying on 
Three Tenors, invoked its inherently suspect analysis.189 After considering 
and rejecting the NTSP procompetitive justification arguments, the 
Commission entered a cease and desist order against NTSP.190 
The Fifth Circuit, like the FTC, chose not to decide whether the 
arrangements in question were subject to per se condemnation but also 
recognized that “some of the NTSP’s practices bear a very close 
resemblance to horizontal price fixing.”191 In applying a truncated 
analysis, the Court of Appeals underscored the heavy burden of proof on 
the FTC to condemn NTSP after a quick look. 
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To justify a quick look analysis, the burden remains on 
the challenger to demonstrate that the proffered 
procompetitive effect does not plausibly result in “a net 
procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on 
competition.” If, after examining the competing claims of 
anti– and procompetitive effects, it remains plausible that 
the net effect is procompetitive or that there is no effect 
on competition, then “[t]he obvious anticompetitive effect 
triggers abbreviated analysis has not been shown.”192 
The Fifth Circuit found that the anticompetitive effects of the NTSP 
practices at issue were “obvious” and that the “procompetitive 
justifications do not plausibly result in a net procompetitive effect or in no 
effect at all on competition” and concluded that the quick look approach 
was appropriate on these facts.193 
The FTC again invoked quick look on Realcomp II Ltd. v. F.T.C..194 
In that case, the FTC challenged the practices of an association of real 
estate brokers in Michigan which restrained competition among 
brokers.195 Realcomp maintained a database of property listings but barred 
information about exclusive agency and other nontraditional listings in the 
database from being distributed to public real estate advertising websites 
through its database feeds.196 The FTC alleged “that Realcomp’s website 
policy and search function policy injured consumers by explicitly limiting 
the publication and marketing of non–traditional listing, thereby 
eliminating certain forms of competition without cognizable and plausible 
efficiency justifications.”197 The Commission further argued that 
“Realcomp had adopted restrictive policies in order to restrain competition 
from limited service brokers.”198 The Administrative Law Judge dismissed 
the complaint, but the Commission overruled that decision.199 
In applying the quick look framework, the Commission found 
Realcomp’s “restraints on discounters advertising and on the 
dissemination of information to consumers regarding discounted 
services”200 obviously anticompetitive by analogizing those restraints to 
(1) music companies’ “restrictions on truthful and non–deceptive 
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advertising”; (2) dentists refusal to provide insurance companies x–rays 
from patients; (3) exclusion of a rival at a trade–show by marine dealers; 
and (4) agreement among automobile retailers to limit the hours that 
showrooms are open.201 The Commission’s use of analogy to establish 
obviousness is a departure from the Three Tenors, which held that courts 
must be guided by “economic learning and experience of the market.” 202 
Critics have questioned whether, using analogy as the criteria, it is possible 
to make a confident judgment about the principal tendency of the 
restriction.203 Critics have also argued that the restraints in cases cited by 
the Commission as analogous to Realcomp’s behavior were broader than 
those in Realcomp and warned of the “slippery slope of argument by 
analogy.”204 
However, the Commission also ruled in the alternative that the 
restraints at issue were unreasonable after undertaking a full Rule of 
Reason analysis.205 The Court of Appeals affirmed on this ground and did 
not pass on the Commission’s use of quick look.206 
Despite these successes, the Commission has not always been 
victorious in urging the quick look analytical framework. As discussed 
above,207 in Actavis, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the FTC’s 
arguments that reverse payments should be held presumptively unlawful 
and subject to a quick look analysis. The setback in Actavis, however, has 
not led the FTC to abandon quick look. In North Carolina State Board of 
Dental Examiners v. F.T.C.,208 the FTC charged that the North Carolina 
State Board of Dental Examiners had, through a series of administrative 
procedures, effectively excluded non–dentists from the North Carolina 
market for teeth whitening.209 The FTC held that the Board’s conduct was 
unlawful under both a quick look and full Rule of Reason analysis.210 The 
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their likely anticompetitive effects.”).  
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reason analysis without reaching the question of whether to apply quick–look analysis.”).  
207 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.  
208 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).  
209 Id. at 1109.  
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Fourth Circuit affirmed,211 but the Supreme Court, affirming the Court of 
Appeals, did not address the quick look issue.212 
Currently, in Matter of 1–800 Contacts, Inc., the FTC has alleged that 
1–800 Contacts and its rivals agreed to restrain price competition in search 
advertising auctions.213 The FTC argues that the bid rigging agreements 
constitute price restraints as well as advertising restraints and are 
inherently suspect.214 Specifically, the FTC complaint alleges: 
As horizontal agreements that restrain price competition 
and restrain truthful and non–misleading advertising, the 
Bidding Agreements are inherently suspect. Furthermore, 
the Bidding Agreements are overboard: they exceed the 
scope of any property right that 1–800 Contacts may have 
in its trademarks, and they are not reasonably necessary 
to achieve any procompetitive benefit. Less restrictive 
alternatives are available to 1–800 Contacts to safeguard 
any legitimate interest the company may have under 
trademark law.215 
This allegation may well move the notion of quick look well off its 
moorings. In one paragraph, the Complaint conflates per se, quick look 
and full–blown Rule of Reason concepts and seems inherently confused 
about conduct that it asserts is inherently suspect. 
2. Department of Justice 
Despite promulgation of a structured Rule of Reason analysis that 
parallels the FTC’s “inherently suspect” approach, during the Clinton 
Administration,216 the Department of Justice has not actively advocated 
quick look. The Justice Department did argue quick look in the Brown 
University217 case decided six years prior to Cal Dental. The Justice 
Department also alleged a quick look theory in the recent “no call” cases 
involving Silicon Valley executives,218 but those cases have largely settled 
without any further development of the quick look doctrine. 
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214 Id. at para. 32.  
215 Id. 
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3. Private Litigation 
In the post–Cal Dental era, the lower courts have been quite reluctant 
to invoke quick look in private antitrust litigation. Courts have declined to 
engage in truncated analysis where (1) competitive effects are not 
“obvious”219 or are “far from readily apparent”220; (2) the challenged 
arrangement has “unique” features221; (3) the circumstances surrounding 
the alleged restraint are “complex”222; and (4) the contours of the market 
are not sufficiently well–known or defined to permit the court to ascertain 
without the aid of extensive market analysis whether the challenged 
practice impairs competition.223 
This is not to suggest that the courts have never utilized quick look. 
For example, in Teledoc v. Texas Medical Board, the district court held 
that a Texas Medical Board requirement that a doctor must have face to 
face interaction with a patient before prescribing drugs, thereby 
prohibiting telephone consultations that result in prescribing drugs for the 
patient, constitutes an unlawful restraint of trade.224 
What accounts for the lower courts’ inertia with respect to quick look? 
Part of the explanation surely lies in the lack of guidance from the Cal 
Dental decision225 and the Supreme Court’s subsequent lukewarm attitude 
to quick look expressed in Actavis and Leegin.226 Part of the explanation 
may be in the growing hostility in the federal courts to private antitrust 
actions.227 Neither explanation is complete because neither explanation 
accounts for the success of the FTC in arguing for the quick look standard 
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227 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (stressing the need to 
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in the face of failure by private litigants. However, Edith Ramirez, former 
FTC Chair, has offered an explanation for this anomaly.228 She argues that 
“[a]s an expert body, the FTC is well positioned to advance antitrust 
doctrine . . . .”229 Indeed “[w]e have often seen the FTC incorporate into 
its decisions new ideas and modes of analysis that have yet to be accepted 
widely by the courts.”230 Furthermore, appellate courts have accepted the 
FTC’s quick look framework.231 Ramirez also observes that “[a]lthough 
the courts of appeal in each of these [quick look] cases affirmed and 
adopted the FTC’s analysis, federal district courts might well have been 
reluctant to apply novel approaches had the courts ruled in the first 
instance given their institutional preference for precedent.”232 
III. PRESUMPTIVE LEGALITY? 
The focus of the quick look framework has been to establish shortcuts 
to finding antitrust liability. However, if we are to view conduct on a 
spectrum, with one and representing per se liability, then, in theory, the 
other end of the spectrum should represent per se legality or presumed 
lawfulness. One perhaps unanticipated development emerging from the 
quick look approach is that just as certain conduct can be summarily 
condemned because it is obviously anticompetitive, so, too, certain 
conduct can be summarily adjudged per se lawful because it is obviously 
procompetitive. Indeed, the Supreme Court in American Needle 
recognized the concept of presumptive legality, noting that where a certain 
amount of cooperation among competitors is necessary for a product to 
exist, the agreements among joint venture participants are “likely to 
survive the Rule of Reason” and therefore do not need a “detailed 
analysis.”233 Accordingly, the Rule of Reason “can . . . be applied in the 
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twinkling of an eye” to find no liability.234 The American Needle approach 
built on the Court’s earlier observation in NCAA that certain NCAA rules 
may well be presumptively lawful: 
It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory 
controls of the NCAA are . . . procompetitive because 
they enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletes. 
The specific restraints . . . that are challenged in this case 
do not, however, fit into the same mold as do rules 
defining the conditions of the contest, the eligibility of 
participants, or the manner in which members of a joint 
enterprise shall share the responsibilities and the benefits 
of the total venture.235 
The Seventh Circuit in Agnew v. NCAA,236 relying on American 
Needle, construed the foregoing language “as a license to find certain 
NCAA bylaws that ‘fit into the same mold’ as those discussed in Board of 
Regents to be procompetitive ‘in the twinkling of an eye’ . . . that is, at the 
motion to dismiss stage.”237 Ultimately, however, the Agnew court 
declined to apply quick look because it concluded that the scholarship 
regulations at issue did not “fit into the same mold” as the eligibility 
regulations in NCAA and therefore required a more detailed examination 
under the Rule of Reason.238 
In addition, the Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly may encourage 
a greater focus on the concept of presumptively reasonable. In Twombly, 
the Court was clearly concerned that legitimate business behavior was 
being attacked in private treble damage actions,239 thereby adding 
significantly to the already high cost of antitrust litigation and creating a 
significant problem of false positives.240 The Court then assigned the 
district courts the task of gatekeepers to filter out unworthy cases at the 
motion to dismiss stage to contain discovery costs and minimize any issue 
of false positives.241 The concept of presumptive reasonableness, which 
would force antitrust plaintiffs to come forward with strong evidence of 
wrongdoing at the motion to dismiss stage, would facilitate the weeding 
out process that Twombly demands. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In the two decades since the Cal Dental ruling, the decision stands as 
a lost opportunity to provide a detailed framework for the quick look 
concept. The lower courts have been reluctant to embrace quick look 
analysis. Among plaintiffs, only the FTC has actively (and effectively) 
advocated for the concept of presumptive illegality. Quick look languishes 
in limbo. Ironically, the legacy of Cal Dental may turn out to be that it led 
courts to develop rules of presumptive legality rather than presumptive 
illegality. 
